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I. Introduction 
The economies of East Africa are presently experiencing a phenomenon 
which to many trained in conventional economic analysis must appear most 
curious and puzzling. Despite the existence of positive marginal products 
in agriculture and significant levels of urban unemployment, rural urban 
labour migration not only continues to exist but, .indeed, appears to be 
accelerating. Conventional economic models with their singular dependence 
on the achievement of a full employment equilibrium through appropriate 
wage and price adjustments are hard put to provide rational behavioural 
explanations for these growing levels of -urban unemployment.in the absence 
of absolute labour redundancy in the economy as a whole. Moreover, this 
lack of an adequate analytical model to account .for the unemployment pheno-
menon often leads investigators to expound a plethora of rather amorphous 
and dubious explanations ranging from the "bright lights" of the city to 
downright irrationality of school leavers to account for this perplexing 
phenomenon. 
Although a precise statistical measurement of urban unemployment in 
East Africa has rarely been attempted owing to conceptual difficulties of 
definition and manpower constraints on actual data collection, few if any 
economists and economic planners acquainted with the situation in 
East Africa would deny that the problem of open unemployment in the modern 
urban economy is beginning to reach very serious proportions. Fortunately, 
the unemployment problem in East Africa is not yet compounded by the 
existence of severe population pressure relative to the availability of 
arable land as is the case of a. number of countries in Asia. Nor have the 
cities of East Africa yet evolved into the prototype of islands of modernity 
and affluence surrounded by a sea of slums so typical of the favellas of 
Latin America. But they are no doubt moving very rapidly in this direction. 
And so, the question of how the urban unemployment problem is to be attacked 
has recently been given very high priority both by politicians and planners 
in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Numerous poli-cy proposals have been put 
forth. Some have been acted upon-while many still remain in the proposal 
stage. Among others, the following policies can be singled out for 
attention: 
1. Immediate and direct employment creation either by government 
fiat or as in the case of Kenya's "Tripartite Agreement" of 196U 
by some "voluntary" agreement among employers, trade unions and 
government. 
2. The expansion of urban employment opportunities directly and 
indirectly through accelerated programs of industrial investment 
and growth. The literature on development strategy is permeated 
with arguments emphasizing the multidimensional benefits of indust-
rialization, for example, through policies of import substitution. 
East Africa was an early, if somewhat reluctant advocate of 
rapid industrialization. However, the difficulties of overemphasis 
on industry are now becoming painfully apparent. 
3. Attempts to prevent the urban wage from rising too rapidly in 
the absence of full wage flexibility. 
h. Increased rural investment in the form of extension services and 
settlement schemes designed to make rural life more attractive. 
5. Moral Exhortations (e.g. in Kenya) for the urban unemployed to 
"return to the land". And finally 
6. Enforced "back to the land" programs of the Tanzanian variety. 
In* this paper, we shall attempt to evaluate the likely efficacy of 
these alternative policies for reducing urban unemployment. However, in 
order to analyze policies one must first•specify the causal mechanism under-
lying the phenomenon of urban unemployment. This is especially true in 
view of the particular economic and social milieu in East Africa. Consequently 
we shall first formulate a model of rural-urban migration which we believe 
provides an acceptable first approximation of the socio-economic realities 
in the three East African countries. 
II. A Two-Sector Model of Migration with Unemployment1 
as 
The basic model which ve shall employ can be described/a two-sector 
internal, trade model with unemployment. The two sectors are the permanent 
urban and the rural. . For analytical purposes we shall distinguish 
"between, sectors from the point of view of production and income. 'Speci-
fic ally v it is assumed that the urban sector specializes in the production 
of a manufactured consumer good, part of which is exported to the rural 
sector in exchange for agricultural goods. .-The latter sector has a choice 
either of producing only a single agricultural good some of which is 
exported to the urban sector using all available labour or using only part 
of its labour to produce a smaller amount of this good while exporting 
the remaining labour to the urban sector in return for wages paid in the 
we 
form of the manufactured good. Thus/do not assume that the agricultural 
sector is characterized by "labour surplus" in the sense that a reduction 
of the labour input could be accomplished without any sacrifice of total 
2 
output. We are making the assumption,however,that the typical migrant 
retains his ties to the rural sector and, therefore, the income that he 
earns as an urban worker will be considered, from the standpoint of sectoral 
3 . -welfare, as accruing to the rural sector. However, this assumption is 
not at all necessary for our demonstration of the rationality of migration 
in the face of significant urban unemployment. 
The crucial assumptions to be made in our model are first that the 
minimum wage paid in the urban sector is fixed at a predetermined level and 
• '-• •' ' ' . 't-
is substantially higher than agricultural earnings and, second, that rural-
urban migration will continue so long as the expected urban real income 
(defined below) at the margin exceeds real agricultural product - i.e. 
prospective rural migrants below as maximizers of expected utility.^ 
For analytical purposes, we shall assume further that the total urban labour 
force consits of a permanent urban proletariat without ties to the rural 
sector plus the available supply of rural migrants. From this combined pool 
of urban labour, we assume that a periodic random .job selection process 
exists whenever the number of available jobs is exceeded by the number of 
5a 
job seekers. Consequently, the expected urban wage will be defined as the 
fixed minimum wage (expressed in terms of manuf&ctural goods) times the 
proportion of the urban labour force actually employed (see equation (6) 
below). Finally, we assume competitive behaviour on the part of producers 
in "both sectors with the further initial simplifying., assumption that the 
price of agriculture (defined in. terms of consumer goods) is determined 
directly by the relative quantities .of the two goods produced. 
Consider now the"following mathematical and graphical'formulation 
of .the model. 
Agricultural Production Function-: 
(1) X = f ( N L ) ' a a A, 0 j f„< 0 
where, 
X, is output of the agricultural good, . 
A • 
N is the rural labour used to produce this output, 
L is the fixed availability of land, and f' is the partial derivative 
of f with respect of H . 1\. .H. 
Manufacturing Production Function: 
(2) X = f„ (N„ K) 
M M M f'> 0, f" <0 M M 
where, 
X^ is the output of the manufactured consumer good, 
N is the total labour (urban and rural) necessary to produce this 
output, 
K is fixed capital stock, and f^ is the partial derivative of f with 
respect to N„. M 
Price Determination: 
(3) P A = ^ , p' >0 where 
P.. the price of the agricultural good in terms of the consumer good, 
(i.e., the terms of trade) is a function of the relative outputs 
of agricultural.and consumer goods when the consumer good serves 
as numeraire. '• 
Agricultural Real Wage Determination: 
(U). WA = PA _ 
where, WA, the agricultural real wage, is equal to the value of labour's 
marginal product in agriculture expressed in terms of the consumer good. 
Manufacturing Real Wage: 
(5) W = f' > W . 
M M — M 
The real wage in manufacturing, expressed in terms of consumer goods, 
is equated with the marginal product of labour in manufacturing because 
of profit' maximization on the part of perfectly competitive producers. 
However, this wage is constrained to be greater than or equal to the fixed 
minimum urban wage. In our analysis, we shall be dealing only with cases 
in which f^ = W^ (i.e. there is never an excess demand for labour at the 
minimum wage). 
Urban Expected Wage: 
(6) W... II N ^ _ ye M M , M < 1 
u N N -u u 
Where the expected real wage in the urban sector, W^ is equal to the 
minimum real wage W adjusted for the proportion of the total urban labour 
force(permanent urban plus migrants denoted as N ) actually employed, ^ M , 
u IT u 
Only in the case of full employment in the urban sector is the expected wag 
equal to the minimum wage. 
Labour Endowment: 
(7) N. + N = 1 + N = N 
A u R u 
that is, there is a labour constraint such that the sum of workers employed 
in the agricultural sector (N ) plus the total urban labor force (N ) must 
Xi U. eaual the sum of initial endowments of rural (M_) labour which in turn equa ~ n 
the total labour endowment (N). 
Equilibrium Condition: 
C8> v A » w J . • 
Equation (8), an equilibrium condition, is derived from the hypothesis 
tnat migration to the urban area is a positive function of the urban-rural 
expected wage differential. This can be written formally as 
(9) ft = <|>(WM.NM P f!), <)>' >0, *(o) = 0 U N A A 
U 
where fr^ is a time derivative. Clearly then, migration will cease only when 
the expected income differential is zero, the condition posited in (8). 
It is important to note that this assumes that a migrant gives up only his 
marginal product. Other assumptions could he made. Much of the literature 
has stressed that in peasant economies producers receive their average 
product which is'higher than their marginal product. Indeed, this is at the 
heart of the well known Lewis and Fei-Ranis models. C However 
th^e models ignore the migration decision and seem to assume that 
migrants continue to receive their share of peasant production yet migrate-
only if jobs are actually available. In East Africa, it appears that 
migrants continue to receive income from land after migration and commonly 
hire labour to work on their farms in their absence. There is. also a consi-
derable group of landless individuals who work on farms for wages. Thus it 
would appear that our assumption is not unreasonable. The analysis could 
easily be modified to make earnings foregone equal to average product, 
however. 
We thus have 8 equations in 8 unknowns (X„ , X,,, EL , Nw, Wn , We, N and A ' M' A' M5 A' u' u 
? A) and given our production functions and the fixed minimum wage it is 
possible to solve for the equilibrium unemployment•rate and, consequently, 
the equilibrium expected wage, relative output levels and terms of trade. 
Let us analyse the equilibrium and the overall adjustment process in terms 
of the following diagrammatic representations .of the model. 
Figure 1 brings together all 8 equations in terms of a four quadrant 
diagrammatic framework. The two production functions are shown in quadrants 
B and D. Given labor endowments as portrayed in quadrant C and these 
production functions, a hypothetical production possibility curve MQZT is 
generated in quadrant A. However, with a given and -fixed urban real wage 
W,,, we see from quadrant B that the maximum consumer goods output will be 
OF - i.e. that output at which W„ = f*. Moreover, if we assume that the M; M 
permanent urban labour endowment, N , cannot be transferred to the agricultural 
sector, then the maximum attainable level of agricultural output would be OR 
as shown in quadrants A and D. Consequently, the operative production possi-
"i-v'-r crnrve is RQ.Z^ 
Wow it is 'evident from this framework that the locus of full employment 
points is that shown by ZQ in quadrant A. And the only full employment 
point consistent with the prevailing minimum wage would be point Z. But 
is point Z an equilibrium point as defined in our model? Ho, because the 
expected urban wage (WE = W at g) is less than P.f! by assumption. U 1YL A A 
Consider the transfer of an additional worker 
from the rural to the urban sector, i.e. rural employment falls to N* - i 
in quadrant D while the urban labour supply rises to N* + 1 in quadrant B. M 
We see from quadrant (B) that, given W , this migration will result in 
positive urban unemployment thereby lowering the expected wage W ».(equal 
to the slope of AF) below the minimum wage W_, (eaual to the slope of AZ„.)'^ a M ~ x<i 
But this expected wage is equal 
to FG = DE = VS consumption goods. The loss in agricultural output (f^) is 
X| J = YZ. But given the terms of trade, assumed to be the slope of Oa 
derived from (3), these VZ agricultural goods are equivalent to ZT consumer 
good. Since ZT < VS = VQ'the migrant will gain income measured in terms of 
the consumer good, by leaving the farm. Alternatively, we see that his 
expected consumer goods earnings through migration VQ' is equivalent in value 
to QY agricultural goods at the terms of trade associated with point V on 
the actual production frontier. Since Q'X is greater than VZ the migrant 
also gains income measured in terms of the agricultural good. Consequently, 
we may conclude that there will be further migration and that equilibrium 
T . . . 
can be obtained only with urban unemployment.. • Even though such an equilibnu 
say at point H in quadrant A at which (8) is also satisfied, necessarily impli 
a suboptimum situation from the point of view of the economy as a whole, it 
does represent a rational, utility maximizing choice from the point of view of 
individual rural-urban migrants and, as will be demonstrated below, will 
likely represent a welfare improvement for the rural sector as a whole. 
One final procedural point might be raised at this juncture. So far we 
I ve assumed that the urban minimum wage is fixed in terms of the consumer 
good. What, if instead, the minimum wage were fixed in terms of the agricul-
tural good? We would then substitute for equation (5) 
f' 
(5«) w = — > ¥ ' M P - M 
Substituting (U) and (5') into .-(7) we get the equilibrium relationship 
(9) •• fTm\ ' NM 
>1 
N u 
We can then imagine an economy starting initially at production point Z on 
the production possibilities frontier (Figure 1A) again assuming that 
A" A <• 
N 
^A/ at that point. The adjustment process will again be reached 
N £ 
through a simultaneous raising of P^f^ and lowering of W^. As relative 
agricultural output falls, P will rise. This in turn will cause output of xx 
the consumer good to fall since producers will produce only up to the point 
that f' = W„ which rises in terms of -consumer goods, and f' can be raised M M M 
only through output restriction (f^ < 0). Therefore, in general we would 
find the equilibrium point lying southwest of Z and south of H. Output of 
both goods suffers. Whether this will cause more or less unemployment than 
in the initial case is indeterminate since N„, falls. 
M 
Although our initial assumption is a bit easier to handle, the principal 
conclusion remain unaffected if we make the minimum wage fixed in terms of 
the agricultural good. Equilibrium is only achievable with unemployment. 
Actual minimum wage setting is usually done with reference to some general 
cost of living index, and food is the largest single item in the budget of 
most urban workers O-Q > CZK) • Hence,the second case may be somewhat more 
realistic. Note that in the first case the "true" real wage was reduced 
somewhat by the rising agricultural good price, while in the latter case 
it is increased by the falling price of the consumer good. 
Ill An Evaluation of Alternative Policies 
On the basis of the general model presented in Section II, let us now 
consider in turn the efficacy of the six policy alternatives listed in the 
Introduction. 
( A) Employment Creation by Fiat or Voluntary Agreement 
In an attempt to rectify the continuous trend of diminishing employment 
opportunities (a decline of 90,000 jobs from 1960 to 196k) in wage paying 
industri es and the sharp rise in urban unemployment resulting in part from 
the serious school-leaver problem after independence, the government of 
Kenya negotiated a "voluntary" Tripartite Agreement in 196U with the 
Federation of Kenya Employers and the Kenya Federation of Labour. The 
express purpose of this agreement was the creation of U0,000 new jobs in 
the shortest possible time. The Agreement was that the. Public Services 
wer^ to increase the number of their employees by 15 per cent. For their 
part the private employers were to expand job opportunities by 10 per cent 
while workers were to abide by a one year moritorium on wage increases and 
refrain from strike actionAlthough the participants to' the-agreement 
would probably be the first to admit that it was merely a stop-gap measure, 
there is considerable doubt whether in fact the agreement was even a short 
run success. It is true that many new jobs were created in spite of the 
obvious financial problems faced by local authorities as well as the Central 
Government. But the important questions to ask in the context of the model 
of Section II are; first, in the longer run was the resulting job creation 
greater than that which would have been forthcoming had there been no 
agreement; and, second, what was the impact of the agreement on rural-urban 
migration and, ultimately, on urban unemployment? 
Our model would indicate that, at least for private employers, immediate 
job creation in the absence of simultaneous wage reductions could be achieved 
only at the expense of higher unit costs. Thus, one might expect that in the 
longer run employers would attempt to neutralize the initial effect of excess 
labour inputs by slowing down the normal rate of further job creation as 
output expands, and/or by failing to replace those who leave their jobs with 
new employees. At least one well known observer of the East Africa scene 
feels that this was in fact the experience of Kenya following the agreement 
(r/3J , p 183 fn. **). 
Concerning the indirect effect of the agreement on the volume and level 
of urban unemployment, our model would indicate that the immediate creation 
of new urban jobs would upset the unemployment equilibrium by raising 
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expected urban incomes. This would stimulate further rural-urban labour-
migration and could quite conceivably lead to higher levels of urban unem-
ployment if the labour force were to expand by more than the number of actual 
new jobs created. Solid evidence on this question is not available so that 
we can only limit ourselves here to confirmatory educated judgement ( C ' 4 i p ' -
But. indeed, it is very doubtful from the strictly economic viewpoint (as 
opposed to the political considerations involved) whether the Tripartite 
Agreement or, for that matter,, any agreement either voluntary or by fiat 
which attempts to bypass the dictates 0feG0n0IIi:LC forces is likely to meet 
with more than -very limited success. 
(B) Accelerating Industrial Growth - • 
A common panacea often prescribed'by economists for all the ills of 
developing nations is rapid industrialization. At least one well known 
treatise on economic development defines the success of various development 
processes in terms the ability of countries to reallocate a majority of 
its labour force from agriculture to industry. ' Unfortunately, most 
cross-sectional and time-series evidence' of the;relationship between 
industrial growth and employment generation in less developed countries 
provides a uniformly consistent picture of a significant employment lag . 
It is well-known that in the three East African countries this 
employment lag has not only been significant but for quite a prolonged period 
there 
(late fifties and early sixties)/was in fact a negative, relationship - i.e.. 
employment in manufacturing actually declined absolutely while output expanded 
Numerous reasons can be cited to account for this phenomenon among which the 
rapid rise in urban wages, the increased mechanization of production, and the 
improved efficiency of those already employed as a result of learning-by-doing 
and on-the-job.training programs might be singled.out as the most important. 
The crucial point to be made in this context, however, is that even though 
rapid urban industrial growth, if successfully achieved," might indeed create 
more employment opportunities, it will also accentuate the influx of rural 
migrants if simultaneous steps are not taken to reduce rural'-urban real-wage 
differentials. Consequently, the net result of increased industrial growth 
might not only be an increase in urban employment but also a concomitant 
- 11 -
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increase in -urban unemployment. . Consider, the following, argument. 
Elsewhere, on the basis of a dynamic model of rural-urban 
based on expected wage differential 
migratiorV_it has been "shown that "in order to prevent the urban unemployment 
wage 
rate from rising in response to widening urban-rural/differentials, the 
following relationship must be satisfied^C.?^J J I ): 
(10) dy = d a U Y yda - y6 - aB- Bda 
where, 
y is the rate of urban employment growth, 
a is the percentage urban~rural wage differential, and 
3 is the natural rate of permanent urban labour force growth - i.e., 
labour growth net of rural-urban migration. 
Therefore, given an unemployment rate, equation (10) tells us by how 
much the annual rate of job creation must increase (dy) just to keep the 
unemployment rate from increasing if there is further widening of the 
urban-rural percentage wage differential (da)'. F o r 
example, suppose an economy is initially characterized by an annual rate of 
employment creation in the urban sector of h percent (y = Oh), a natural 
rate of urban labour growth of 2 percent (3 = .02) and a 100 percent urban-
rural wage differential (a = 1.0). On the basis of these parameters- an equilit 
rium unemployment rate will result. Suppose that the urban-rural earn-
ings differential widens by another 20 percent (da = ,20). It follows from 
the above equation that in order to prevent the urban unemployment rate from 
rising, the additional increase in the annual rate of job creation (dy) must 
be 1,9 percent (i.e. dy = , 019). Thus, the growth rate of urban employment 
opportunities must rise from h per cent to '5.9 per cent. Since empirical 
studies of the relationship between industrial output and employment growth 
in less developed nations have indicated that for every, one per cent increase 
in the rate of job. creation total output must expand.by approximately an 
additional 3.5 per cent C 3 3 "] we. see that in our hypothetical example 
industrial output growth must increase from ih per cent per annum (3-5 x .Oh) 
to almost 21 per cent per annum just to prevent the unemployment rate from 
rising. Conversely, equation (10)' tells us that if the rate of industrial 
output growth were to expand by half ..from 1.U to 21 percent annually, the 
equilibrium urban unemployment rate would remain unaffected if the 
- 12 -
urban-rural earnings gap is allowed "to widen by an additional 20 percent 
(a not at all unlikely phenomenon). 
Despite the hypothetical nature of the,• abovevillustration, it does-
underline in a simple and plausible way the immense problem, of reducing 
urban unemployment rates through accelerated industrialization without a 
simultaneous and concentrated effort designed to prevent a further widening 
of the urban-rural earnings differential. As long as urban real income is 
permitted to expand at a relatively faster pace than rural income, induced 
growth of labour migration will counter much of the effect of accelerated 
industrial growth in deducing urbtin unemployment.. . • Moreover, this 
same analysis would appear to be valid for a whole range of policy alternatives 
such as employment subsidies,, direct government hiring and industrial tariff 
protection all of which are means of expanding employment while maintaining 
high (and increasing) industrial real wages. 
C. Exhortation to Return to the Land 
Exhortations that individuals should return to the land to seek opportu-
nities in agriculture rather than migrating to the cities in a vain search 
for jobs have been heard repeatedly in recent speeches of East African politi-
cal leaders. While these exhortations are admirable and economically sound, 
their long run success is highly doubtful. If our model correctly describes 
C O 
the situation (and the Royal Commission in Kenya/agree d), it is in the 
rational self-interest of individuals to seek, urban employment even though 
the probability of actually gaining such is low. Throughout history policies o 
moral suasion have typically met with limited success in persuading indivi-
duals to abandon their self-interest. When social and private benefits diverge 
it is a rare phenomenon when private calculations do not prevail. 
D. Rural Development Schemes 
A spate of proposals designed to increase rural real incomes and amenity 
levels have been advanced in recent years. Some of the simpler ones have 
be'n concerned with provision of amenities such as electricity, piped water, 
clinics, cinemas etc. in rural areas so as to reduce the. relative attraction 
of urban areas particularly for school leavers. Other proposals have included 
rural settlement schemes, extension services, and training centres. Still 
others have stressed the importance of locating industry in rural areas so 
as to spread non-agricultural employment opportunities. Finally, Norbye 
has proposed an extensive program of labour-intensive rural -works schemes( 
All of the proposals have one common denominator -- they represent attempts 
to reduce the urban-rural disparities in real income (where real income 
includes effects of amenities) and thus the magnet effect of the city. 
The important question here is whether it is in fact possible to reduce 
real wage disparities sufficiently through these schemes to eliminate urban 
unemployment, Existing disparities in the distribution of amenities are 
9 
considerable. As such, differences in money wage levels (corrected for 
cost of living) understate the true real (or utility) wage differentials. 
Moreover, it is inconceivable that any feasible change in amenity levels 
could counter the effects of existing money wage differences. Note that 
most proposals are designed to equalize amenity levels — a reversal of 
the inequality would be necessary to cut seriously into urban unemployment. 
(Furthermore, many amenities require" money expenditure as well if they are 
to be taken advantage of). 
Settlement, extension, and training schemes, if effective, will 
increase real rural income and, therefore, will work towards a partial 
reduction of urban-rural differentials. However, once again it is unlikely 
that these will raise agricultural productivity sufficiently to close the 
gap Furthermore agricultural price levels are likely to fall with rapid 
expansion of output. 
Locating industry in rural areas raises further interesting questions. 
If minimum wage legislation is to apply to such enterprises, we are likely 
to find a dispersal of open unemployment into smaller centers. Migrants will 
be coming to these centers vainly seeking employment rather than flocking 
to Nairobi, Car es Salaam or Kampala where they tend to be more visible. 
Whether a given amount of investment will create more employment if it is 
dispersed in rural areas is a moot point but the usual arguments concerning 
economies of agglomeration suggest the contrary. If, on the other hand, 
rural industries are not to be subject to minimum wage legislation, and/or 
net additional investment will be forthcoming to establish them, they will 
--Ik -
help to reduce unemployment. However, as long as higher wages continue to 
he paid in the major urban areas, open unemployment will persist. 
llorbye's proposal for rural works programmes is particularly 
interesting."'""'" It would' be likely to reduce urban-rural real wage gaps 
in two ways. First, individuals could be employed in such projects during 
non-peak periods in agriculture. Therefore, they would sacrifice less 
agricultural income in accepting such employment than in migrating to urban 
areas. Furthermore, the effect of feeder roads, irrigation systems, dams 
etc. to be built in such a program will be to raise agricultural productivity — 
thus further reducing real income differentials. Nevertheless such programs 
will require scarce organizational resources if they are to be successful 
and will also place substantial burdens on the fiscal system (or on external 
aid sources as Norbye recognized) for their finance. However, so long as 
actual urban wages continue to be high relative to real rural earnings (our 
previous argument still holds that even these programs are unlikely to 
close theLddos-e the gap in the forseeable future), urban unemployment will-
still persist albeit at somewhat lower levels than at present. 
E. Enforced Back-to-the-Land Movement. 
We've already seen that although migration in the face of unemployment 
is rational from an individual's point of view, it gives rise to foregone 
output from the standpoint of the economy as a whole. Looking back at 
Figure 1 it is obvious that if migration in excess of the number of urban 
jobs were prohibited, the economy could produce at Z instead of H. This 
would be unambiguously superior since the same amount of the manufactured 
good would be produced and there would be more of the agricultural good. 
Clearly there is a divergence between private and social incentives. In 
such a case restriction of individuals' free choice may be warranted-
Tanzania has attempted to institute such a program. Individuals in urban 
areas must hold a card stamped to show that they are presently employed. 
If they cannot produce such a document they are subject to being returned 
to their home (rural) area. 1 1® 4Although we know that the economy as 
a whole must be better off under such an arrangement, some individuals or 
sectors of the economy may be made worse off in the absence of. compensation 
- 15 -
It is tempting to take the position that-this is unimportant since there 
is potential for lump-sum. compensation such that some•are made better off 
and none worse off. However, lump-sum ..compensation is notoriously difficult 
to arrange in an actual economy. Therefore, a useful question :to explore is 
whether the rural sector as a whole (including its "labour exports") will 
be made better or worse, off by a policy of forced repatriation in the absence 
of compensation. 
We have shown elsewhere that the rural sectors' gain in "production" of 
the manufactured good from exporting one additional unit of labour in the 
face of urban unemployment is equal to W^ (l=R) where R is the fraction of 
rural migrants in the urban labour force Q ^ Q - The logic is quite clear. 
The additional migrant earns the expected wage but his entry into the urban 
labour force, by raising unemployment, lowers the expected wage of all other 
migrants by the factor R. Thus the gain to the sector is less than the 
apparent gain to the individual migrant. 
From a production standpoint the rural sector gives up an amount of 
the agricultural good f' as a result of exporting the one additional unit 
of labour. However, the reduction of agricultural output will cause its 
price P to rise. Hence the loss of sectoral income(measured in terms of Jri. 
the manufactured good) resulting from foregone output of the migrant is 
P^f^ (l - where n is elasticity of the permanent labour force's offer 
curve of the consumer good in exchange for the agricultural good. 
This quantity is less than the value of the marginal product of labour in 
agriculture (P„f!) because of the price effect and, indeed, if n < l(inelasti 
demand) it will be negatived This of course is no more than the familiar 
proposition that aggregate farm income may be reduced in years of plentiful 
harvests. Thus we see that individuals overstate the loss of output accompa-
nying their departure from agricultural production. 
It is clear from the above that whenever P^ fj^  (l " < ^ ( 1 - R) 
will be in the interest of the rural sector as a whole to allow migration 
even with resultant unemployment. Individual decisions (migrate if P.f!^ < W^) 
will lead.to less than optimal migration from the sectoral standpoint if 
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l ^ . — > R, a likely result since R< 1 and m many cases n><l.-
In light of Tanzania's expressed policy to increase rural well being( 7JT 
it is ironic that the most likely effect of a forced' back-to-the-land policy 
is a reduction in the welfare of the rural sector. 
Meanwhile the permanent urban labour force will benefit substantially 
through full employment at the high minimum wage. 
This conclusion depends on the absence of compensation to the rural 
sector accompanying the policy of forced repatriation. In fact at least two 
forms of compensation are being offered. Tanzania is assisting the repat-
riates to find land in various settlement schemes. Although settlers are 
expected to repay some capital and land costs advanced through loan schemes 
there is some subsidy involved and extension services also serve to raise 
the level of rural earnings above the marginal product of labour in agricul-
ture which we have posited. Furthermore, there are various schemes of price 
support for agricultural goods. If agricultural output can be exported at 
constant prices (not entirely likely since demand for coffee under the 
international quotas and sisal is quite inelastic ( / *4 ) although 
adjustments in export taxes and marketing board margins could conceivably 
keep producer prices constant) or if domestic prices are supported at cons-
tant prices, then rural welfare may actually be increased by the back-to~the~ 
land policy. In this case n is infinite and private decisions result in 
more migration than is in the interest of the sector since R >0. Still some 
migration with unemployment may be in the interest of the sector since the 
criteria for migration to lead to an increase in sectoral welfare becomes 
P f' i P.f' < W (l - R) and at Z we know that "A A is in the range of 5 to i. A A u ^ r -
M 
(/£>) We can conclude under such conditions that some forced repatriation 
will benefit the sector although it cannot be determined without more 
specific data whether the move from H to Z (Figure l) will benefit the 
sector as a whole even with price supports. Supporting domestic agricultural 
prices above the market clearing level also gives rise to the problem of 
-^ricultural surpluses and their financing. 
In summary, Tanzania's policy represents a promising approach to the 
problem of urban unemployment. It will unambiguously benefit the economy 
as a whole but some form of adequate compensation will have to be given the 
rural sector as a whole if it is not to be made worse off by the, policy.1113 
Flexible Wages 
( .The classic economic solution for the problem we are dealing with here 
is to allow,wages and prices to. become fully flexible through abolishing 
minimum-wage legislation.. Clearly, if. labour markets operate competitively 
and without legislative constraint., urban., wages will; fall to approximate 
equality with rural earnings for workers of comparable skill, (if there are 
real costs of migration, or.: disutility, associated with urban living a 
positive differential, will- remain.-.. This issue is treated in detail by Eagen 
( ). Lower urban wages will cause employers to. substitute labour for 
capital and total -urban employment will expand. At the same time the 
reduction in wage differentials will cause some unemployed migrants to 
return to agriculture and further migration will be induced only as new urban 
jobs are created. The economy will be free to produce on the production 
possibilities frontier (because all resources will be fully utilized) northwe 
of Z. Preferences of consumers reflected, in prices will lead the economy to 
reach an optimum optimorum. 
Even if this prescription is correct it is politically infeasible in 
the present East African situation.. .Trade unions are .in a strong position 
vis a vis the relatively small and . concentrated, "modern sector1'' employers 
(the most important of which is government). Furthermore, urban workers and 
their organizations are more politically informed.and able to bring pressure 
on governments. Governments, however, are not unaware of the problems raised 
by relatively high urban wages. Mboya has stated: 
The role of trade unions may also have contributed to the. unemployment 
problems. We must come to grips with a rational incomes policy which 
relates increases in wages to gains in productivity if we are to avoid 
serious problems..',.. Trade Unions should also be thinking in terms 
of the national-welfare before meeting with employers over the bargain-
ing table "... Unless the Unions turn their attention to these matters 
. they may find that their present policies are creating substantial 
inequities in income distribution, (L , p. xviii.) 
Indeed the most promising feasible approach appears to be one of restraint 
on increases so as to keep relative wages constant. (L'/J .• 7 ). Even this 
more modest task has not been accomplished to date. Ghai shows that 
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in Kenya "between .-19-60 and 1966 "the average total income of farmers has risen 
half the rate of unskilled, urban workers."- ( L 7J y p. 3 ) Helleiner 
presents data suggesting that in Tanzania between 1962 and 19^5 the real wage 
in private commerce increased by h2 per cent (38 percent in the public sector) 
while real income of. smallholders increased by only 8 per cent.. Even allowing 
•for weakness in the underlying data the conclusion is inescapable that real 
12 
wage .differnetials have been increasing. The earlier discussion (part III 
B above) made the point that with increasing differentials the economy will 
be required to attain unrealistically .high rates of industrial expansion 
just to keep unemployment,rates constant (implying increasing absolute levels 
of unemployment). In fact it would appear that the East African economies 
will be hard put to expand urban.employment, at a sufficient rate to keep 
unemployment rates constant even with unchanging urban-rural wage relatives. 
Two justifications for high urban wages have been.raised by Green. ( 7 ) 
The first is that high wages increase'worker productivity thereby leading 
to lower unit labour costs. . .One possible explanation is that better fed and 
housed workers are able to work more productively: (this is a variant of the 
"minimum decent standard" argument). We are inclined to question the 
- - 13 
quantative significance of this in the.East African situation. Another 
explanation forwarded by Green.(without convincing evidence) is that 
employers are irrational. "Labour in. East Africa came to be treated virtually 
as a free good with serious effects on efficiency and cost levels." (p. 218)"""' 
While it may be true that- high wages act as a shock treatment forcing 
employers to improve, organizational methods, it would seem that increased 
competition and lower levels, of protection might be just as effective in 
forcing entrepreneurs to produce efficiently. 
Green also takes a second line of attack. "Markets' for manufactured 
products and commercial food production are basically dependent on total 
wage and salary payments. To the extent that higher wage levels raise 
total payments, they expand these markets." (p. 217)• A model could be 
constructed that would demonstrate such a relationship. What is required 
is very high income elasticities "of demand by.urban.workers for products 
in which economies of scale are significant. It is interesting to note 
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that this line of argument has become quite popular in Kenya of late and 
has received wide circulation in the form of rfewspaper editorials as well 
in parliamentary debate. The argument is at first appealing in terms of a 
very simple Keynesian framework of demand multipliers. Under closer-examine 
tion it becomes rather dubious. First of all it is hard to argue that deman 
is a binding constraint on aggregate output in Kenya.Secondly, even if 
- constraint existed 
a /it is by no means certain that higher wages will in fact increase 
demand. Green asserts 0Z9 J P- 223) that demand for labour is in fact wage 
elastic in East Africa. If this is true, then higher wages will reduce the 
total urban wage bill. He weakens his argument further by pointing out 
(p. 226) that higher wages will lead to inflationary pressure on the balance 
of payments and government deficit and may increase the savings-investment g, 
Furthermore, important questions of"-social equity arise if wage increases 
widen the rural-urban Income differential. One must recognize that in East 
Africa labour in the"modern sector represents a relatively priveleged 
minority. 
Even if we were prepared to accept these dubious justifications of high 
wages the unemployment problem would remain. A real divergence between maxi 
mizing output and employment would arise. Our model suggests strongly that 
with higher urban wages, open urban unemployment would rise in the absence 
of physical controls on migration. 
Research is needed to estimate empirically the probable effects of Ic-we 
wages on urban employment. It is quite certain that the full effects would 
be felt only over time — the wage elasticity of labour demand will be highe 
over a long time period than in the immediate short run. However, looking 
only at this side of the question is to miss the point of our analysis. To 
take an extreme case, imagine that urban wages were cut substantially but 
no additional urban employment opportunities were generated. Our model 
suggests that nevertheless -unemployment would be reduced since the accompany 
ing reduction in expected wages would cause unemployed migrants to return 
to agriculture even though rural earnings remained unchanged (in a dynamic 
context the rate of rural-urban migration would fall thereby reducing unemp."1 
ment levels even if -urban-rural migration flows were nil). 
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A standard prescription to counter the effect of high minimum wages is 
the provision of a wage subsidy or expanded direct government employment in 
accordance with a shadow-price criterion. Thereby, social costs are equated 
with net private costs of employment and the economy should reach the same 
. . . . 17 
position that it would if wages were free to adjust. Such a policy, through 
lowering the net private costs of labour would give rise to' expanded employment. 
However, as long as the minimum wage continues to be paid to employees, the 
additional employment will raise expected wages through a higher probability 
of finding a job and induce additional migration. It is possible that the 
level of unemployment will be increased as a result of the policy. 
IV. Summary and Conclusions 
We have examined a number of proposed policies designed to reduce open 
urban unemployment in East Africa. Our analytical framework has been a model 
based on the hypothesis that migration is a response to expected income 
differentials, the starting point of the analysis being the existence of 
minimum urban wage levels substantially higher than earnings of individuals 
with comparable skill in agriculture. In such a situation urban unemployment 
serves to reduce the expected urban wage and indeed serves as the equilibrating 
factor. Individual migration to urban areas in the face of substantial open 
unemployment is shown to be a rational response from individuals seeking to 
maximize expected utility. 
If this model correctly captures behavioral relationships in the present 
East African economies it follows that asking individuals to voluntarily 
return to the land will be opposed to their self interest. Furthermore, 
various proposals to expand urban employment (e.g., accelerated industrializa-
tion through direct government participation, wage subsidies, or protection) 
to 
will fail/eliminate open unemployment so long as wages significantly higher 
than rural earnings continue "to be paid, 
a 
Enforcing/_back-to-the-land movement represents an unambiguous improve-
ment from the standpoint of the economy as a whole. However, if such a 
pc icy is not accompanied by some form of subsidy to the rural sector it may 
be made worse off by the policy. Where rural welfare is an important social in spite of obvious drawback 
consideration this point becomes important. We would therefore conclude thai;' 
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Tanzania's recent experiment is a promising step in the right direction. 
apparent 
However, it would appear that the "best policy (given the/political 
infeasibility of reducing relative urban wages) would be some combination 
of industrial expansion (with the intention of equating marginal- value 
products in the two sectors) and-migration restriction. Governments, no 
doubt, are caught in a dilemma. Neither eliminiting minimum wage legisla-be 
tion nor placing physical controls .on migration are likely to/politically 
palatible although the latter policy may be more feasible. The alternative,, 
however, is to continue to suffer -substantial and growing levels of open 
unemployment in urban areas. 
The long run implications of this phenomenon (i.e., the loss of 
potential output, and perhpas more importantly, the proliferation of social 
and political unrest) are now becoming painfully clear to the governments 
of East Africa. Several attempts to come to grips with the issue have 
been made in recent'times. However, unless the interrelationships between 
rural-urban earnings differentials, job creation, and migration are fully 
appreciated, policies directed towards only one aspect of the problem are 
likely to make a minimal lasting impact on urban unemployment. 
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1. This is a condensed version of a more general and rigorous mathematical 
model developed by the same authors in an earlier paper (12). 
2. We do not make the special assumption of an agricultural labour surplus 
for the following reasons. Most available empirical evidence to date 
tends to cast doubt on the labour surplus argument in the context of 
those economies of Southeast Asia and Latin America where such a surplus, 
if it did exist, would most likely be found (U) (25) (30) (37). 
Moreover, few economists would seriously argue that a general labour 
surplus as usually defined exists in East Africa, the area of immediate 
consideration. 
3. In East Africa, this notion that migrants retain their ties to the rural 
sector is quite common and manifested by the phenomenon of extended 
family ties and remittances to rural relatives of large proportions of 
urban earnings. However, the reverse flow, i.e. rural-urban monetary 
transfers, is also quite common in cases where the migrant is temporarily 
unemployed ana, therefore, must be supported by rural relatives. See 
(3b) especially study of Lushoto district. 
h. For some empirical evidence of the magnitude of these earnings differen-
tials in East Africa see Ghai (7), Helleiner (lh) and also International 
Labour Office (l6). For comparable estimates of these differentials in 
a cross-section of less developed countries including those of Africa, 
see Berg (2). 
5. For a lengthy and detailed description of the rationale of such a proba-
bility model of labour migration, see M. Todaro (39)-
5a Again, the qualitative conclusions of the model do not depend on the 
precise nature of the selection process. All that is necessary is that 
the expected wage be positively related to the minimum wage and inversely 
related to the level of unemployment, ceteris paribus. We have assumed 
random selection, however, not only for analytical convenience but also 
because it directly corresponds to an appropriate dynamic construct 
developed in Todaro (3"i). There it is shown that over time expected and 
actual earnings will converge to a positive number even though the rate 
of job creation is less than the rate of migration so that unemployment-
is increasing. 
6. <j> (o) = 0 is purely arbitrary. If, instead, we assume 6 (a) = 0 where 
can take on any value, migration will cease when the urban-rural 
expected wage differential is equal to a. None of the subsequent 
analysis is affected qualitatively by specifying a ^  0. (8) would 
merely be written as W. + a = We. A u 
6a Note that AE is the total wage bill in the manufacturing sector (equal to 
W^NM). The expected wage is equal to this constant, wage bill divided by 
the total urban labour force, N - i.e., the slope of the line originating 
from A and intersecting line EF at a point verically above the point on 
the horizontal axes representing the total urban labour force. 
7. It is theoretically possible, but not likely, that the institutional 
minimum wage could be equal to the free market full employment equilibria , 
wage in which case the actual and expected urban wage would be identical. 
In such a case conventional analysis suffices. 
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8. These proposals are admirably summarized by Mboya (22). See also the 
papers by Van Arkadie (36) , Mac Arthur (19) and Odinga (26). 
9- Same idea of current disparaties- in Tanzania can be found in (UO). 
10. Whether the absolute level of unemployment is affected by such dispersal 
depends on the response of migrants to given expected wage differentials 
in different size centers. We are now beginning research in Kenya which 
will test, in addition to other questions, whether city size is an 
independent determinant of migration inflows. 
11. See Norbye (27) . He. refers to the successful experience with such schemes 
in East Pakistan which has been documented by Gilbert (8). Hagen ( (11) 
pp. 309-13) contains a useful analysis of these schemes which also 
receive theoretical rationale in Bardhan (l). 
11a Enforcement of this policy received-considerable' attention in The Nationalist 
(Dar es Salaam), during the early months of 1968. Initiative for enforce-
ment lies with local"authorities and as such has received sporadic attention. 
lib It is interesting to note that Tanzania is already experiencing difficulties 
in keeping these repatriated" urban'unemployed on farm settlments. This 
is not too surprising given the substantial expected real earnings 
differential. Either better quality lend or more adequate compensation is 
probably required. However, in the absence of measures to reduce urban 
wages, even these costly policies are likely to achieve only limited long 
run results. 
12. The Tanzania case is also documented by the I.L.O. (l6) and Knight (17) 
has shown that similar trends have been taking place in Uganda. -
13. It is true that as incomes rise expenditures on food increase and indeed 
there is a shift towards higher quality protein foods. Howe (15) estimates 
income elasticities of Nairobi' families of .17 for all food,- .1+5 for milk 
and eggs, and .33 for meat and fish. The estimates for Kampala are 
. significantly higher but fail to adjust for family size. Estimates for 
smaller Uganda towns (when income is defined and include subsistence 
production) are quite similar to Nairobi estimates. He also has evidence 
that at low income levels individuals receive net assistance from relatives 
in rural areas while at higher levels of income reverse flows occur. As 
such the elasticity estimates may overstate the real rise in consumption 
of wage earners as income rises. Certainly the existence of substantial 
sharing of income with members of the extended family by workers earning 
the minimum wage belies the contention that this wage is a minimum 
required by the wage earner to provide a minimum decent living standard 
for his immediate family. The evidence is fairly strong that at lower 
wages less would be shared. 
lit. A similar point has been made by Soper (28) 
15. See the main editorial in The Daily Nation (Nairobi, 20 September 1968) 
16. See Massell (20) for an analytic treatment of the problem in aggregate 
terms stressing the importance of both foreign exchange and savings 
constraints. This matter has attracted considerable professional attention 
of late, particularly in the""two'gap models of Chenery and Strout (3). 
Schatz (29) has argued the case.for demand stimulation when such demand 
is channeled only to industries with elastic supply conditions. While 
the argument is logically correct, it is highly questionable that extra 
demand can be so narrowly channeled. Stolper (31) has challenged Schatz1s 
position. 
17. We have e-xstsiinsd this case in considerable detail in our earlier paper (12). 
A clear exposition of the shadow pricing argument can be found in Hagen 
























B.F. ^Massell, ,:0n Growth Models and Multipliers: The Case of the 
Missing Constraint"', The East African Economic Review, Vol. 3 (New 
Series) No. 1, June 1967, pp. 73~77. 
B.F.^Massell and J. Heyer, "Household Expenditure in Nairobi: A 
Statistical Analysis of Consumer of Behavior," Economic Development 
and Cultural Change (Forthcoming) 
T.J. Mboya, "Priorities in Planning," in J. Sheffield, op cit. 
Nigeria, Report of the Commission on the Review of Wages, Salary and 
Conditions of Service of the Junior Employees of the Governments of 
the Federation and in Private Establishments I963-6I+ (Lagos: Federal 
Ministry of Information, 1965) . 
J.K. Nyerere, Socialism and Rural Development (Dar es Salaam; 1967 ) 
A. Pepelasis and P. Yutopaulis, Surplus Labour in Greek Agriculture, 
1953-1960 (Athens: Center of Economic Research, 1962). 
R.S. Odinga, "Land Settlement in the Kenya Highlands," in Sheffield 
(ed.), 0£ cit. 
O.D.K. Norbye, "Long Run Employment Prospects and the Need for Large 
Scale Rural Works Programmes," in Sheffield (ed.) op cit. 
T. Soper, "Labour Migration and Labour Productivity: Some Aspects of 
Experiences in East, Central and Southern Africa," Race Relations 
Journal (Johannesburg), XXV, N. 3.!+ (July-December 1958) 
S.P. Schatz-, "Underutilized Resources, 'Directed Demand,' and Deficit 
Financing (illustrated by Reference to Nigeria," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, LXXIII (November, 1959) 
T. Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1965) . 
W.F. Stolper , Planning Without Facts: Lessons in Resource Allocation 
from Nigeria's Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966). 
M.P. Todaro, "Urban Unemployment in Less Developed Countries: An 
Economic Analysis," Yale Economic Essays, Vol. 8 , No. 2 (Fall, 1968) 
United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs, The Growth 
of World Industry, 1938-1961: International Analysis and Tables 
(New York: 1965), p. 96 and 98. 
Ruthenberg (ed.), Small Holder Farming in Tanzania: Ten Case Studies 
(?)" IFO Institute (Munich: 1968) 
L. Cliffe and Cunningham, "Rural Development Paper No. 3" University 
College, Dar es Salaam, 1968 (Mimeo) 
B.R. Van Arkadie "The Role of Agriculture in the Strategy of the Plan," 
in Sheffiled (ed.) op.cit. 
C.H.C. Kao, K.R. Anschel, and C.K. Eicher, "Disguised Unemployment in 
Agriculture: A Survey," in C.K. Eicher and L.W. Witt, eds., Agriculture 
in Economic Development, 129-1+1+ (New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1961+). 
Government of Kenya, Report on the Tripartite Agreement on Measures 
for the Immediate Relief of Unemployment". Inter-African Labour Institute 
Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 1, Feb. 1965, pp. 9^98. 
M.P. Todaro, "A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in 
Less Developed Countries," (mimeo) 
Tanzania, Background to the Budget, An Economic Survey. i?<5("68 
(Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1967)• 
